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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a convicted felon serving a lengthy sentence in
state prison. Suspecting you have violated a prison rule, correctional
authorities place you in solitary confinement for thirty days without
hearing your side of the story. You seek redress for the prison's hasty
judgment, but doubt the objectivity of the very state that convicted
you in the first place. Federal court clearly is your best option, but to
what extent are the federal courts appropriate forums for prisoners
to assert claims of unfair treatment in state prisons?
This question has been the focus of considerable debate for many
years.' While prisoners' rights advocates fight vehemently to expand-or, more realistically, to preserve-federal court oversight of
state prison matters,2 opponents scowl at the extraordinary number
of state inmate claims' crowding federal court dockets at the expense
of civilian taxpayers.4
1. CompareBell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,547 (1979) ("Prison administrators... should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security."), with Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (Stevens,J., dissenting)
("[E]ven the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty-at the very minimum the right
to be treated with dignity--which the Constitution may never ignore."); For background
information and additional perspectives, see Melvin Gutterman, The Contours ofEighthAmendment
Jurisprudence: Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 399-403 (1995) (discussing
separation of powers doctrine in context ofjudicial activism in prison affhirs); Susan N. Herman,
The New Liberty: The ProceduralDue Process Rights ofPrisonersand Others Under the Burger Court, 59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 482, 570-75 (1984) (proposing prison due process alternatives that strike better
balance between deference and prisoners' rights; David M. Levitt, No Other State Uses Solitary
Confinement Like N.J., THE REC., Mar. 6, 1994, availablein LEXJS, NEXIS Library, PAPERS File
(observing that punishments found cruel and unusual in other states are standards at youth
detention center); MURDER IN THE FIRST (Warner Bros. 1995) (provoking sense ofjustice and

fair play after innocent prisoner was sent to solitary confinement for several years).
2. See 1 MIcHAEL B. MUSHLN, RIGHTS OF PRiSONERS 7-8 (Donald D. Kramer ed., 2d ed.

1993) (stating that federal courts, as constitutional law authorities, possess role as ultimate

guardians of prisoners' rights). Because prisons are relatively hidden from public view, the
potential for abusive state practices is immense. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Procedural
Rights ofPrisoners,97 HARV. L. REV. 103, 111 (1983) (commenting that in dosed prison world
prisoners are likely to be subjected to invalid state action).
3. The 33,000 state inmate claims heard in federal court in 1993 represented a five-fold
increase since 1977. See David G. Savage, High Court Ruling Limits Inmate Lawsuits, LA TIMES,
June 20, 1995, at A12.

4. See id. (documenting popular viewpoint that rise in state inmate claims is wasteful of tax
dollars).
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For inmates wishing to challenge a state prison's administration of
discipline, this debate over prisoners' rights assumes great significance. Prisons are miniature, closed societies with extensive rules and
punishments ranging from loss of privileges to solitary confinement 5
After charging inmates with violating prison rules, prisons often insure
some degree of fairness by providing formal procedures such as
written notice, a disciplinary hearing before a panel of prison officials,
the opportunity to testify, and the opportunity to call witnesses and
produce documentary evidence.6 Whether the U.S. Constitution
actually requires prisons to furnish such rudimentary procedures has
been the subject of numerous Supreme Court due process cases
during the past two decades, 7 the most recent of which was Sandin v.
8

Conner.

In Sandin, a five-Justice majority held that a prison need not provide
formal procedures when deciding to place an inmate in solitary
confinement for thirty days.9 In reaching this result, the Court
altered its methodology for determining when such procedures are
necessary." Whereas the Court previously examined the wording of
state statutes and prison rules for guidance on when to require

5. See I MUSHLIN, supra note 2, at 422.
6. See id. at 422-23 (describing array of formal procedures that may accompany certain
sanctions). More sophisticated procedures, including the right to counsel and the right to
confront opposing witnesses, generally are not required in the prison setting. See id. at 423
(stating that traditional safeguards associated with criminal trials are not available in prison
context). In support of its finding that inmates were not constitutionally entitled to confrontation and cross-examination rights, the Court in Woffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), cogently
described the context surrounding prison disciplinary hearings as follows:
[D]isciplinary hearings and the imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve
confrontations between inmates and authority and between inmates who are being
disciplined and those who would charge or furnish evidence against them. Retaliation
is much more than a theoretical possibility; and the basic and unavoidable task of
[T)he
providing reasonable safety for guards and inmates may be at stake ....
proceedings to ascertain and sanction misconduct themselves play a major role in
furthering the institutional goal of modifying the behavior and value systems of prison
inmates sufficiently to permit them to live within the law when they are released ....
With some [inmates,] rehabilitation may be best achieved by simulating procedures of
a free society to the maximum possible extent; but with others, it may be essential that
discipline be swift and sure.
Id. at 562-63.
7. See, eg., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1989)
(concluding that no procedures need accompany suspension of visitation privileges); Board of
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 370, 378-81 (1987) (finding that due process applies to denial of
parole); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 461, 471-72 (1983) (holding that due process applies prior
to administrative segregation); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226-28 (1976) (concluding that
no procedures apply prior to interstate prison transfer); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554-56 (finding that
due process applies prior to revocation of good time credits).
8. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
9. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301-02 (1995).
10. See id. at 2300.
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procedural due process,1 the Court in Sandin shifted its focus to the
severity of the proposed punishment by deciding that a set of formal
procedures must accompany only those punishments posing an
"atypical and significant hardship" on the inmate. 2 The Court then
solitary confinement was not an "atypical and
found that thirty days of
3
significant hardship."
The Sandin decision symbolizes the Court's willingness to defer to
state legislatures and prison administrators, as well as its desire to
reduce the number of frivolous inmate lawsuits heard in federal
court. 4 This Note questions the ability of lower courts to apply the
"atypical and significant hardship" standard given the Court's limited
holding in Sandin. In addition, this Note contends that the Court's
new standard probably enables state prisons to impose all but the
most extreme punishments without any accompanying procedures.
Part I of this Note reviews the Supreme Court's most significant
applications of procedural due process to the prison context over the
past two decades. Part II provides the facts of Sandin v. Conner and
the Supreme Court's analysis of the case. Part III analyzes the Sandin
decision in detail and discusses the ramifications of the Court's new
standard. Finally, Part IV presents an alternative approach for
determining when procedural due process should accompany prison
disciplinary action.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

ProceduralDue Process Generally

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."5 Unlike substantive due process, which
serves as a check against invalid government action, the procedural
aspect of the Due Process Clause guarantees that an otherwise
legitimate government action is administered fairly."6 Essentially,

11. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing Court's approach to state-created liberty interests).
12. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2301-02.
13. See id. at 2300.
14. See id. at 2299 (opining that deference to states is especially warranted when "fine-tuning
of the ordinary incidents of prison life" is concerned).
amend. XIV, § 1.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; i&.
16. See Herman, supra note 1,at 502 (explaining that substantive due process claims
challenge lawfulness of state action). Substantive due process claims attack the state's ability to
interfere with individual freedom, not whether the state interfered fairly. See id. For example,
if a state prohibited certain individuals from getting married, those persons most likely would
challenge the state's power to do so rather than the absence of hearings accompanying that
prohibition. See id.
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even if a federal or state entity has the power to deprive a person of
life, liberty, or property, the Constitution may require certain legal
procedures7 to insure that the deprivation is neither arbitrary nor
mistaken.
Exactly when such procedures are mandatory has been the subject
of much Supreme Court attention since its 1970 decision in Goldberg
8
v. Kelly.

Before Goldberg, procedural due process applied only when a
genuine liberty or property right was at stake, but not when the
government sought to revoke a benefit or privilege it had conferred
previously. 9 In Goldberg, however, the Court rejected this distinction
between right and privilege in finding that a state must provide
procedural due process before terminating an individual's welfare
benefits." Although receiving welfare benefits clearly was not a
constitutional right, the state had enacted a statute granting the
privilege of welfare to those who met specific eligibility requirements.2 As a result, the Court reasoned that welfare recipients
acquired a quasi-property interest that could not be revoked arbitrarily, but rather only if the state's legal procedures determined that the
recipient no longer was eligible under the statute.22
The Court further elaborated on these principles two years later in
Board of Regents v. Roth2 3 and Morissey v. Brewer.24 In Roth, a state

university had terminated a non-tenured faculty member without
providing a hearing, 25 and in Morrissey the Court considered whether
an individual was entitled to a hearing prior to parole revocation. 6
In both cases, the Court implemented a two-prong approach that

17. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (stating that "touchstone" of due
process is protection of individual against arbitrary government action (citing Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 121,123 (1889))); see alsoPENELOPE D. CLUTE, THE LEGALASPECTS OF PRISONS
AND JAILS 109 (1980) (noting that purpose of Due Process Clause is to protect citizens against
arbitrary or erroneous government action).
18. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
19. See CLUTE, supranote 17, at 109-10 (explaining that, prior to Goidherg,procedural due
process applied only to government interference with liberty or property rights, and not to
privileges or benefits granted by states).
20. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-65 (1970).
21. See id. at 264 (agreeing with lower court's determination that pre-termination evidentiary
hearing is required to satisfy due process in welfare deprivation cases).
22. See id. (explaining that danger of depriving eligible recipients is crucial factor in welfare
benefits cases).

23. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
24. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
25. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-69 (1972) (reviewing Wisconsin state
law and Wisconsin State University rule that failed to provide review hearings to non-tenured

faculty after termination).
26. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972) (determining whether Due Process
Clause requires states to afford individuals a hearing before revocation of parole).
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lower courts since have applied to all procedural due process
questions.
The first prong, a threshold inquiry, asked whether a
liberty or property interest was at stake and therefore worthy in
principle of some form of procedural protection. 8 Protected liberty
or property interests generally arose either from the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution or from a state-created statutory entitlement similar to the welfare benefits in Goldberg.2 9 Government
actions implicating a protected interest under the first prong then
proceeded to the second prong, under which the Court asked how
much procedure was necessary under the circumstances. 30 The
second prong primarily involved balancing the competing individual
and government interests to determine what procedures supplied an
adequate level of fairness. 3 In Roth, the Court never reached the
second prong because it declined to recognize a constitutional or
state-created interest under the first prong. 2 In contrast, the Court
in Morrissey found that the parolee had a state-created liberty interest
in avoiding the arbitrary revocation of his parole status.3 Applying
the second prong, the Court required the state to fumish the parolee
with notice, a hearing before a neutral tribunal, and the opportunity

27. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71; Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 481-88. For an excellent discussion
of Roth Morrisey,and the development of a bifurcated approach to due process questions, see
Herman, supranote 1, at 482 (tracing evolution of "positivist" conception of liberty beginning
with Roth).
28. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72 (rejecting"wooden" distinction between rights and privileges
when determining due process rights and noting that "liberty" and "property" must be given
some meaning to observe boundaries set by Fourteenth Amendment); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481
(explaining that potential interest must fall within scope of "liberty" or "property" language of
Fourteenth Amendment to require due process).
29. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 575. For a thorough treatment of the entitlement concept, see
Rodney A. Smolla, The Remfgence ofthe Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw: The Price
of ProtestingToo Much, 35 SrAN. L REv. 69, 69 (1982) (evaluating rationales supporting rightprivilege doctrine and entitlement concept).
30. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481-82 (noting that second prong is factual inquiry).
31. See id. at 481-83 (weighing parolees' interest in receiving review hearings against state's
interest in efficient control of inmates).
32. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-75 ("It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person
is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before
to seek another." (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,895-96
(1961))).
33. See Monissey, 408 U.S. at 481-82 (determining that liberty of parolee includes many "core
values" of unqualified liberty and that termination without review inflicts "grievous loss" on
parolee). The Court in Morrissey found that parole bore greater similarity to freedom than
confinement. See i& at 482. Although the state subjected the parolee to many restrictions not
applicable to other citizens, the parolee "relied on at least an implicit promise that parole
w[ould] be revoked only if he fail[ed] to live up to the parole conditions." I Thus, the
parolee had a liberty interest within the protection of the Due Process Clause. See id

1997]

SANDIN V. CONNER

903

to present and cross-examine witnesses before terminating his parole
status.
Since Roth and Morrissey, the Court rarely has had the opportunity

to develop the concept of state-created liberty interests beyond the
prisoners' rights context. 5 There are two explanations for this
phenomenon. First, most judicially recognized liberty interests stem
directly from the Due Process Clause and not from a state's statutory
or regulatory scheme. 6 Second, in cases where a state-created
liberty interest may otherwise have been at stake, the targeted
individual more often has challenged the state's action for its very
lawfulness (through a substantive due process claim) than for its
procedural flaws.3 Prisoners' rights cases are different. Because
states have wide discretion to deprive convicted persons of certain

freedoms, in particular the right to be free from physical restraint,
substantive due process claims brought by prisoners generally are
unsuccessful.3 " It therefore is not by accident that the vast majority
of state-created liberty interest jurisprudence has occurred in
prisoners' rights cases,3 9 when a state's decision to punish is far more

controversial than the nature of the punishment itself.
B.
1.

ProceduralDue Process in the Prison Context

Development of a bifurcated approach

Wolff v.
addressing
involved a
credits-or
satisfactory

McDonnell remains the seminal Supreme Court case
procedural due process in the prison context. 40 Wolff
prison's decision to revoke several inmates' good-time
statutorily mandated sentence reduction in exchange for
behavior-without providing formal procedures.4 1

34. See i&.at 488-89 (stressing that review hearing is narrow inquiry and should remain
flexible).
35. See Herman, supra note 1, at 502 (hypothesizing that Supreme Court has had little
occasion to develop concept of state-created liberty interests because independent protection
of those interests already existed and because Court generally wished to avoid "awkward task"
of clarifying its mediocre rationale).
36. See id. (noting that most civilian liberty interests are based on Constitution, not on state
law).
37. See supranotes 16-17 and accompanying text (explaining why substantive due process
claims are more common when questionable state actions are at issue).
38. See Herman, supra note 1, at 503 (observing that when states have "acknowledged
power" to deprive individual of freedom, as is case with prisoners, procedural claims become
more prevalent).
39. See id (noting that procedural issues more often arise as fallback position when states
are assumed to have power to deprive individuals of certain liberties).
40. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
41. SeeWolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 544-52 (1974).
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Applying the first prong of Roth's bifurcated approach, the Court
concluded that the state's good-time credit statute created a liberty
interest in avoiding additional prison time.4 2 Because the inmates
could forfeit good-time credits only if found guilty of serious
misconduct under the statute, certain procedures were necessary to
insure the inmates would not lose that benefit arbitrarily. 3 In what
later became significant dictum, the Court indicated that solitary
confinement, like the loss of good-time credits, constituted "a major
change in the conditions of confinement" requiring procedural
44
safeguards under a first prong inquiry.
Two years after Wolff, the Court in Meachum v. Fano5 clarified the
first prong liberty interest analysis.46 At issue in Meachum was
whether a prison must supply due process before transferring inmates
of a medium-security prison to a maximum-security facility with
substantially worse living conditions.47 The Court explained that
changes in confinement conditions, even those having a "substantial
adverse impact" on the prisoners, did not automatically invoke
protection from the Due Process Clause itself.4 Because the state

42. See id. at 557 (explaining that because state acknowledges that deprivation of good-time
credits was punishment for major misconduct, prisoners' interest in keeping good-time credit
is "liberty" within Fourteenth Amendment meaning).
43. See id. at 557-58 (equating liberty interests with property interests that require hearing).
44. See id. at 571 n.19. Comparing solitary confinement with the loss of good-time credits,
the Court explained:
Although the complaint put at issue the procedures employed with respect to the
deprivation of good time, under the Nebraska system, the same procedures are
employed where disciplinary confinement is imposed[; thusJ... as in the case of good
time, there should be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary
determination of the factual predicate for imposition of the sanction.
Id. Applying the second prong of the balancing test, the Court in Wolff explained that
deprivation of good-time credits was not as devastating as the revocation of parole was to the
inmate in Morrissey. See id. at 560-61. As a result, the'inmate in Wolffwas entitled to written
notice, a written statement of factual findings, and the right to "call witnesses and to present
documentary evidence" if doing so would "not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
correctional goals." Id. at 566. Under the second prong of the Roth test, however, the Court
found that an inmate's right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses would "present
greater hazards to institutional interests." Id. at 567. Moreover, because the right to counsel
.would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as
a means to further correctional goals," the Court did not require states to provide that right.
Id. at 570.
45. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
46. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-26 (1976) (explaining that nature of interest
was critical to determining whether due process was violated and that state-created interest is
equal to one created by Fourteenth Amendment).
47. See id. at 217-23 (contrasting Norfolk, a medium-security institution, with Walpole, a
maximum security institution, where "the living conditions are substantially less favorable").
48. See id. at 224 (stating that "the determining factor [of whether due process attaches]
is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight" (citing Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)) and concluding that absent statutory or constitutional creation of
liberty interest in remaining at specific prison, due process did not attach).
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had the right to confine convicted persons in any of its prisons, the
Court found that the inmates did not have a liberty interest in
remaining at any particular facility. 9 Moreover, unlike Wolff, there
was no state prison regulation in Meachum either giving the inmates
a right to stay in their original institution, or preventing the prison
from transferring the -inmates without a specific finding of misconduct.5 °
From Meachum onward, the Court consistently required prisons to
provide procedural due process whenever a statute or prison
regulation created a liberty interest in avoiding a specific punishment.5 In addition, although prisoners did not possess an inherent
liberty interest when a prison's action fell "within the normal limits or
range of custody which the conviction ...authorized [a] state to
impose,"52 the Court interpreted the Due Process Clause itself as
bestowing a liberty interest in avoiding punishment that went beyond
the normal scope of a typical criminal conviction." Examples of this
were Vitek v. Jones,5 4 in which an inmate was transferred to a mental
56 in which a
institution against his will, 5 and Washington v. Harper,
prison administered antipsychotic drugs to an inmate without first
obtaining his consent.5 7 Finding that the actions transcended the
49. See h. at 224-25 (explaining that once conviction is valid, deprivation of certain liberties
is constitutional).
50. See id. at 225-27 (contrasting fact that there was no specific statute entitling prisoners
to remain in particular prisons with Woo, in which state statute was source for good-time
credits).
51. See Part I.B.2 (reviewing Supreme Court cases recognizing liberty interests created by
state statutes and regulations); see also 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 2, at 432-33 (observing that due
process protections were necessary when rights at stake were created by statute, state or federal
regulation, or by express constitutional provision). Theoretically speaking, law would create
liberty only if the individual were a "creature of the state." Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). AsJustice Stevens wrote in his dissent to Meachun
The relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to
infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant state laws either create property
rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who must live in an ordered society.
Of course, law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a
complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source.
*.. [Liberty] is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather
than particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.
Id (Stevens,J., dissenting).
52. Id at 225.
53. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2295, 2297 n.4 (1995) (recalling two instances in which
Court has found that due process yielded liberty interest independent of state law (citing
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980))).
54. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
55. See Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 484 (1980).
56. 494 U.S. 213 (1990).
57. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 213, 213-14 (1990). Antipsychotic medications,
often called "neuroleptics" or "psychotropic drugs," are used to treat mental disorders such as

schizophrenia. See id.
at 214. These drugs, by altering the chemical balance of the brain, are
designed to help one organize thought processes and regain a rational state of mind. See id.
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permissible scope of the inmates' prison sentences,"8 the Court in
both cases recognized liberty interests emanating directly from the
Due Process Clause.59 Vitek and Washington were exceptions, however, to the court's general rule that liberty interests yielding procedural
protection could arise only from statutory or regulatory
entitlements.'
2. A new test for state-createdliberty interests
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,6" the Court implemented a somewhat novel approach for
determining whether a particular deprivation generated a protected
liberty interest 2 In Greenholtz, inmates claimed they had been
denied parole without sufficient due process.6'
Under the first
prong of Roth, the Court read the parole statute to order an inmate's
release from prison after the minimum term unless the Parole Board
could raise an acceptable justification for denying parole.' Interpreting the statute's use of the word "shall" instead of "may" as a

58. See id. at 222; Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493.
59. See Washington, 494 U.S. at 221-22 ("We have no doubt that, in addition to the liberty
interest created by the State's Policy, [the inmate] possesses a significant interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration ofantipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492 ("Were an ordinary citizen to be subjected involuntarily
to these consequences, it is undeniable that protected liberty interests would be unconstitutionally infringed absent compliance with the procedures required by the Due Process Clause.").
60. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2295, 2297 n.4 (1995) (indicating that Due Process
Clause itself creates liberty interests in rare cases, namely Vitek and Washington). Liberty interests
arise primarily from statutes, state and federal regulations, or express provisions of the
Constitution. See supra note 51.
61. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
62. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2298 (observing that Court in Greenholtz adopted new
methodology for defining state-created liberty interests).
63. SeeGreenholtzv. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1979)
(arguing that statutes and Board's procedures denied inmates procedural due process).
64. See id. at 9-11. Specifically, the statute stated:
"(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for
law; (c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline;
or (d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other
training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life
when released at a later date."
Id.at 11 (quoting NEB. REV. SrAT. §§ 83-1,114(1) (1976)). The Court initially noted, however,
that the mere existence of a parole system did not itself generate a liberty interest in the parolerelease decision. See id.at 9-10. In response to the inmates' argument that parole release was
analogous to the parole revocation that had implicated a liberty interest in Monkisey, the Court
found that parole revocation was a more "grievous loss" because the parolee in Moirsseyactually
had experienced freedom. See itL at 9. But see id&at 19-20 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("From the day that he is sentenced in a State with a parole system, a
prisoner justifiably expects release on parole when he meets the standards of eligibility
applicable within that system. This is true even if denial of release w[ould] be a less severe
disappointment than revocation of parole once granted.").
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genuine, mandatory curb on the Parole Board's discretion, the Court
found that the inmates had a legitimate expectation of release and
were entitled to due process.65 Applying the second prong of the
analysis, the Court concluded that the state had provided adequate
procedures under the circumstances to satisfy the inmates' due
process rights. 6
Consistent with its holding in Greenholtz, the Court in Board of
Pardonsv. Allen6' also found that the mandatory language of a parole
statute triggered a liberty interest entitling the inmate to procedural
protection.' Several commentators have observed astutely that the
Court's decisions in Greenholtz and Allen overemphasized semantics by
failing to recognize that, in practice, the parole statutes actually
provided officials with very broad discretion in their
decisionmaking. 69 In spite of this criticism, the Court's liberty
interest methodology throughout the 1980s continually involved
combing statutes and prison regulations for mandatory language.
In Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, ° the Court held that
the Board of Pardons had unlimited discretion to modify prison
sentences because the pertinent state statute "impos[ed] no limit on
what procedure [wa]s to be followed, what evidence [was to] be
considered, or what criteria [was] to be applied by the Board."7 1 As
a result, the Board was not required to provide an inmate with a
written statement explaining its reasons for denying a shortened
sentence. 72 The Court applied the same rationale in Olim v. Wakinekona,73 where it found discretionary wording in a regulation that

65. See i& at 11-12 (recognizing Respondent's argument that provision's structure created
presumption that parole release would be granted absent one offourjustifications legitimizing
denial of parole); supra note 64.
66. See id. at 15-16 (detailing Nebraska procedures as including an opportunity to be heard
and, in instances when parole is denied, an opportunity for inmate to receive an explanation
of where "he falls short of qualifying for parole").
67. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
68. SeeBoard of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369,376-80 (1987) (understandingstatute's "the
board shall release on parole" language to be mandatory). In Alen, as opposed to Greenh0ltz,
no second-prong issue was raised as to whether the inmates actually had received sufficient due
process. See id. at 370; infra note 236 (explaining significance of lack of second-prong issue in
Allen).
69. See Alen, 482 U.S. at 384 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that, despite statute's
discretionary appearance, Parole Board was subject to no genuine restraint in determining if
inmate was fit for release); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in
Support of Petitioner at 13, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911) (expressing
view that Allen was "triumph of form over substance"); see also discussion infra Part IIIA
(explaining Allen's perplexing rationale).
70. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
71. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981).
72.

See id.

73.

461 U.S. 238 (1983).
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authorized the transfer of a Hawaiian inmate to a California prison
4000 miles away.74 Similarly, in Kentucky Department of Corrections v.
Thompson,' the Court neglected to find a liberty interest in receiving
certain outside visitors because the visitation rules were not "worded
in such a way that an inmate 76could reasonably expect to enforce them
against the prison officials."
Perhaps no other case embodied the Court's hypertechnical,
language-oriented approach more than Hewitt v. Helms,7 1 the facts of

which were analogous to those in Sandin.71 In Hewitt, the Court
considered whether inmates were entitled to due process before being
placed in solitary confinement for administrative-as opposed to
disciplinary-reasons. 9 As a threshold matter, the Court explained
that because "inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving
[administrative confinement] at some point in their incarceration,"
the Due Process Clause alone did not create a liberty interest."0 The
Court, however, did read the prison regulation's language to require
officials to justify administrative confinement by "the need for
control" or the need to suppress "the threat of a serious disturbance."" Thus, the regulation was sufficiently mandatory to create
a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population. 2 Although the liberty interest entitled the prisoner to due

74. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-51 (1983) (finding unfettered discretion in
decisionmaking because administrator could have denied relief "for any constitutionally
permissible reason or for no reason at all").
75. 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
76. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v.'Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1989). The Court
explained that because the regulations and procedures at issue did not reflect the requisite
"mandatory language, they stop short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached upon
a finding that substantive predicates are met." Id. at 464.
77. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
78. Both Pennsylvania and Hawaii adopted regulations establishing two types ofsegregated
housing within their correctional facilities. In both Sandin and Hewitt, petitioners argued that
they were placed in solitary confinement without sufficient due process. See Sandin v. Conner,
115 S. Ct. 2295, 2296 (1995); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 462 (1983).
79. See HewiU, 459 U.S. at 462. In Hewitt, the state of Pennsylvania had adopted two basic
types of solitary confinement: disciplinary and administrative. Disciplinary segregation could
be imposed when an inmate was found guilty of a misconduct infraction, and administrative
confinement could be imposed when an inmate "pose [d] a threat to security, when disciplinary
charges [we]re pending against an inmate, or when an inmate require[d] protection." Id. at
463 n.1.
80. See id. at 468.
81. Id. at 470 n.6 (requiring notification in writing that details pending investigation,
alleged violations, and right to have a hearing if disciplinary action is contemplated following
conclusion of investigation (citing 37 PA. CODE § 95.104(b)(1) (3) (1978))).
82. See id. at 470-71.
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process under the first prong, the Court ultimately held that the
prison had provided ample procedures under the circumstances. 3
In summary, before Sandin v. Conner the Supreme Court recognized
state-created liberty interests when a statute or prison regulation
contained: (1) substantive predicates or specific criteria to guide
prison officials in deciding whether to alter the conditions or length
of an inmate's confinement; and (2) mandatory language, earmarked
with words such as "shall" or "must," permitting an adverse change in
confinement only if the substantive predicates were met. 4 Naturally,
those state prison codes that explicitly curtail the behavior of their
prison officials were more susceptible to due process attack, a
consequence even the Court itself could not deny:
It would be ironic to hold that when a State embarks on such
desirable experimentation it thereby opens the door to scrutiny by
the federal courts, while States that choose not to adopt such
procedural provisions entirely avoid the strictures of the Due
Process Clause.85
Fittingly, the Court's consideration of Sandin v. Conner was based
largely on its desire to address and hopefully to eliminate this
problematic effect.8 6
II.

SANDIN V. CONNER

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
DeMont Conner currently is serving a thirty-years-to-life sentence at
a maximum-security prison in Hawaii. 7 In August 1987, a prison
guard subjected Conner to a strip-search, including an inspection of
his rectal area for contraband. 8 During the search, Conner used
profanity and made sarcastic statements to the guard. 9 Several days
later, the prison gave Conner written notice that he had been charged
with "high misconduct" for physically interfering with correctional

83. See id. at 477 (including timely notice of charges brought against inmate, review of
existing evidence against inmate, and opportunity to present statement to committee).
84. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989).
85. Hewit, 459 U.S. at 471.
86. SeeSandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293,2299-2300 (1995) (announcing that "the time has
come to return to due process principles we believe were correctly established in Wolff and
Meachura"); see also Sandin v. Conner, 63 U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1994) (No. 93-1911)
(granting certiorari to re-examine circumstances in which state regulations afford inmates liberty
interest protected by Due Process Clause).
87. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2295.
88. See id. at 2295-96.
89. See id. at 2296.
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functions,90 and with "low moderate misconduct" for using obscene
language and harassing a prison guard.9 1

At Conner's disciplinary hearing, the adjustment committee refused
to allow him to present witnesses in his defense. 2 The committee
found Conner guilty of all charges and sentenced him to thirty days
of "disciplinary segregation" in solitary confinement, which he

promptly served.9" Conner appealed the committee's decision, and

after reviewing the incident several months later, a deputy administrator found the "high misconduct" charge inappropriate and expunged
the guilty charge from Conner's record. 4

Prior to the administrator's actions, however, Conner instituted a
civil rights action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the adjustment
committee chairperson and other prison officials in the United States

District Court for the District of Hawaii.95 His amended complaint

alleged, among other claims, that the committee's refusal to allow

him to call witnesses deprived him of adequate procedural due
process.96

The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.97 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed,98 concluding

90. See id. (citing HAw. ADMIN. R. § 17-201-7(a)(14)). Section 17-201-7(a)(14) provides:
ProhibitedActs; high misconduct category.
(a) Acts constituting misconduct of high category shall be as follows:...

(14) The use of physical interference or obstacle resulting in the obstruction,
hindrance, or impairment of the performance of a correctional function by a public
servant.
HAW. ADMIN. RuLE § 17-201-7(a)(14). Hawaii's prison regulations create several levels of
misconduct ranging from "greatest misconduct" to "minor misconduct." See Sandin, 115 S.Ct.
at 2296 n.1.
91. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296 (citing HAw. ADMIN. P. § 17-201-9(a) (5)). Section 17-2019(a) (5) provides:
ProhibitedActs; low moderate misconduct category.

(a) Acts constituting misconduct of low moderate category shall be as follows: ...
(5) Using abusive or obscene language to a staff member.
HAw. ADMIN. R. § 17-201-9(a) (5).
92. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2296. According to the adjustment committee, witnesses were
unavailable "'due to move to the medium facility and being short staffed on the modules.'" Id.
(quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at A67).
93. See id. Conner was sentenced to 30 days disciplinary segregation on the "high
misconduct" charge and four hours segregation for each of the two "low moderate misconduct"
charges, to be served concurrently. See iL; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text
(explaining difference between disciplinary and administrative segregation).
94. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296. The "low moderate misconduct" charge remained on
Conner's record. See id. at 2301-02 n.10.
95. See id. at 2296 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides civil cause of action for
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution).
96. See id.Conner prayed for injunctive and declaratory relief for due process violations
in connection with his disciplinary hearing. See id.
97. See also Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296; Brief for Petitioner at 17, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.
Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
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that Hawaii's prison regulations created a liberty interest in avoiding
disciplinary segregation,9 9 and remanded the case to determine
whether Conner had in fact received sufficient due process.' ° The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the regulation contained mandatory
language' authorizing disciplinary segregation only if the committee found "substantial evidence" supporting an inmate's guilt. 02
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to "reexamine the circumstandes under which state prison regulations afford inmates a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause."0 3 In a five-to-four
decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the District
Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the prison
04
officials.'
B. Holding and Rationale
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the sharply divided
Supreme Court held that neither the Hawaii prison regulation nor
the Due Process Clause itself spawned a liberty interest in avoiding
thirty days of disciplinary segregation. 0 5 In reaching this outcome,
the Court explicitly discarded its approach of parsing state prison
regulations for mandatory language and substantive predicates, opting
instead to focus on the nature of the hardship imposed. 06
1.

Discardingthe "mandatorylanguage/substantivepredicates"
methodology

ChiefJustice Rehnquist initially observed that the Court's preoccupation with prison language "encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements
to various state-conferred privileges. " 10 7 This outcome arose because
lower courts continually read prison regulations to create liberty
interests for prisoners just as ordinary statutes created procedurally-

98. See Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Sandin v. Conner,
115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
99. See Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466 (stating that regulations provide explicit standards that
"fetter discretion" and thus create liberty interest).
100. See id. at 1470-71.
101. See id.at 1466.
102. See id.("If the inmate does not admit guilt, or the committee does not find substantial
evidence, the particular outcome-freedom from disciplinary segregation-must follow.").
103. Sandin v. Conner, 63 U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1994) (No. 93-1911); see also Sandin,
115 S.Ct. at 2295.
104. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302.
105. See id. at 2300-02.
106. See id.
at 2299-2300.
107. Id at 2299.
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protected rights and privileges for the general public.'0 8 Unlike
ordinary statutes, however, prison regulations were "primarily
designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a
prison [and not] to confer rights on inmates."'" As a result, the
Court explained, lower courts inevitably applied procedural due
process even when state legislatures did not intend to create liberty
interests. °
According to the Court, this misapplication of procedural due
process had two undesirable effects."' First, it discouraged states
from drafting progressive correctional procedures that otherwise
would provide fair discipline and curb the discretion of that staff who
encountered inmates on a daily basis.' 2 Instead, states were encouraged to "avoid creation of 'liberty' interests by having scarcely any
regulations, or by conferring standardless discretion on correctional
personnel."1 1 3
Second, the "mandatory language/substantive
predicates" approach led to significant federal court involvement in
the routine management of state prisons when, in the Court's view,
14
the states genuinely deserved greater autonomy and flexibility.'
Comparatively trivial prison matters, such as participating in "boot
camp,"" 5 receiving tray lunches as opposed to sack lunches," 6 and
remaining in cells with electrical outlets for televisions," 7 increasingly became the subject of federal due process claims and effectively
"squander[ed] judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to
anyone."",18

108. See id. (stating that courts have drawn negative inferences from mandatory language of
prison regulations). "The Court of Appeals' approach in this case is typical: it inferred from
the mandatory directive that a finding of guilt 'shall' be imposed under certain conditions the
conclusion that the absence of such conditions prevents a finding of guilt." Id.
109. Id
110. See id. ("[S]uch regulations [were] not designed to confer rights on inmates, but the
result of the negative implicationjuisprudence... is instead to attach procedural protections
that may be of quite a different nature.").
111. See id.
112. See id. (explaining that prison guidelines are not created solely to benefit inmates but
also to provide guidelines for subordinate prison employees to follow, thus ensuring more
uniform treatment for similar incidents).
113. Id.
114. See id. ("[Flederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state
officials trying to manage a volatile environment.").
115. See id at 2299-2300 (alleging liberty interest in right to participate in 'shock program,'
a type of boot camp for inmates (citing Klos v. Haskell, 48 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1995))).
116. See id. at 2300 (claiming liberty interest in receiving a tray lunch rather than a sack
lunch (citing Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1990))).
117. See id. (asserting that liberty interest exists in remaining in larger cell equipped with
electrical outlets for television and holding prison job (citing Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 76869 (8th Cir. 1984))).
118. Id at 2299.
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A new approachfor state-createdliberty interests

For the foregoing reasons, the Court announced that a return to
the due process principles set forth in Wolff and Meachum was long
overdue." 9 The Court still maintained that liberty interests could
arise from means other than the Due Process Clause itself. 2 ° In the
Court's words, however, state-created liberty interests could arise only
when a prison's action imposed an "atypical and significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."'
Although recognizing that "prisoners do not shed all constitutional
rights at the prison gate,"' 22 the Court found that "[d]iscipline by
prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct f[ell] within
the expected parameters of the [prison] sentence imposed by a court
of law.""
Accordingly, the Court held that Conner's disciplinary
confinement "did not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty
interest," and thus did not require due process. 124
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that disciplinary
confinement was similar in duration and degree to administrative
segregation and protective custody, both of which the prison could
impose with broad discretion." Responding to the argument that
disciplinary segregation appeared on an inmate's permanent file and
could affect parole prospects, 26 the Court noted that the "high
127
misconduct" charge no longer appeared on Conner's record.
Moreover, whether the "low moderate misconduct" charge would
affect Conner's parole status at some future time was "simply too

119. See i&.
at 2300 ("The time has come to return to the due process principles we believe
were correctly established and applied in Woffand Meachum.").
120. See id.; see also supranotes 52-60 and accompanying text (discussing cases recognizing
liberty interests emanating directly from Due Process Clause).
121. Sandin, 115 S. Ct at 2300.
122. Id. at2301 (citingWolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,555 (1974)). Butseeid. ("[L]awful

incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,
a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.'" (quoting Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977))).
123. Id.
124. 1&

125. See id. at 2300-01 (noting expungement of "high misconduct" charge from Conner's
record meant his confinement "did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary confinement in
either duration or degree of restriction"). Prisons typically impose administrative confinement
when an inmate either presents a danger, is awaiting disciplinary charges, or needs protection.
SeeHewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,463 n.1 (1983). Disciplinary confinement, on the other hand,
is imposed when an inmate is found guilty of a misconduct violation. See id.

126.

See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2303 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

127.

See id. at 2301.

The Court asserted that because of the expungement, Conner's

confinement "mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation
and protective custody." Id.
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attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process
Clause."12 Thus, because disciplinary segregation "was within the
range of segregation to be normally expected for one serving an
indeterminate term of 30 years to life," the Court found that Conner
did not have a state-created liberty interest in avoiding such punishment. 129
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, concluding
that Conner had a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary confinement.13
Disciplinary segregation, Justice Ginsburg contended,
deprived inmates of privileges for extended periods of time and,
unlike administrative confinement, stigmatized them and adversely
affected their parole prospects.13 ' Echoing arguments made by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in dissents to the Court's
earlier prison due process cases,13 2 Justice Ginsburg viewed the Due
Process Clause itself, rather than state prison regulations, as the
source of Conner's protected liberty interest.'13 Justice Ginsburg

128. 1& at 2302.
129. Id.
130. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. See id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (noting that immediate and lingering consequences of
disciplinary segregation qualify such confinement as liberty-deprivingfor purposes ofdue process
clause protection).
132. See, eg., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 470-71 (1989)
(Marshall, J., Brennan, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that liberty interest was not
"created" by Commonwealth's inmate visitation regulations and policies, but rather by the Due
Process Clause); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 251 (1983) (Marshall,J., and Brennan,J.,
dissenting) ("An inmate's liberty interest is not limited to whatever a state chooses to bestow
upon him. An inmate retains a significant residuum of constitutionally protected liberty [under
the Due Process Clause] following his incarceration independent of any state law."); Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460,488 (1983) (Stevens,J., Brennan,J., and MarshallJ., dissenting) ("[Prison
regulations] provide evidentiary support for the conclusion that the [adverse action taken
against a prisoner] affects a constitutionally protected interest in liberty. But the regulations do
not createthat interest. Even in their absence, Due Process safeguards would be required.... .");
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,468-69 (1981) (Stevens,J., and Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "liberty that is worthy of constitutional protection is not merely 'a
statutory creation of the State,'" but is instead a natural extension of the Due Process Clause
(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974))); Greenholtz v.Inmates of Neb. Penal
& Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 22 (1979) (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., and Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that "all prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a liberty
interest of which they may not be deprived without due process, regardless of the particular
statutory language that implements the parole system"); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230
(1976) (Stevens,J., Brennan,J., and MarshallJ, dissenting) ("I had thought it self-evident that
all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights.
It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights
or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.").
133. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Deriving protected liberty
interests from mandatory language in local prison codes would make of the fundamental right
something more in certain States, something less in others.").
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observed, however, that Conner's claim probably would have failed on
remand because he apparently had received sufficient due process
As for the Court's new approach for
under the circumstances."
recognizing state-created liberty interests, Justice Ginsburg criticized
the majority for "leaving consumers of the Court's work at sea, unable
to fathom what would constitute an 'atypical, significant deprivation.'

13 5

Like
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, also dissented.'
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer determined that Conner had a
protected liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary confinement.'
Injustice Breyer's view, however, the Court need not have abandoned
its former standard to prevent trivial prison matters from reaching the
federal courts."s The Court's former approach, according to Justice
Breyer, provided a useful way for lower courts to examine a large
"middle category" of deprivations that were neither serious enough to
invoke protection from the Due Process Clause itself nor so obviously
minor that procedural protections would be inappropriate.13 9 The
falling of the old approach was that it required courts to distinguish
relatively insignificant punishments, such as loss of privileges, from
truly important ones, like disciplinary segregation." ° Nonetheless,
Justice Breyer did not find the task of distinguishing significant and
insignificant deprivations unusually burdensome for the judiciary. 4'
Justice Breyer criticized the Court for disregarding workable
precedent instead of simply explaining that procedural due process
Additionally,
was not meant to accompany minor punishments."
he felt the majority was overlooking the second prong of Roth"1 and

134. See id at 2303-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Unless Conner were to demonstrate ...
that an issue of material fact is genuinely in controversy, his due process claim would fail.").
135. Id at 2303 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 2301).
136. See id.at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Conner suffered significant
deprivation of liberty within meaning of Due Process Clause, regardless of whether it later was
expunged from his record).
138. See i. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (believing that "making thatjudicial judgment seems no
more difficult that many other judicial tasks").
142. See id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that reliance on majority's new
"atypical and significant hardship" standard rather than existing precedent could result in some
lower courts offering protection only to most "significant" deprivations of liberty, and others
extending protection to certain "atypical" hardships that preexisting law would not have
protected).
at 2309-10 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (observing that process due in prison discipline
143. See id.
cases is not "full blown procedure" accompanying criminal trials).
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the use of summary judgment41 as barriers against frivolous prison
claims."
Like Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer stressed the importance of these legal mechanisms in Conner's case 146 because it was
doubtful whether any additional procedures, particularly the
opportunity to call witnesses, were necessary. 4 Justice Breyer would
have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's remand of Sandin to the District
Court to ascertain whether Conner actually received sufficient due
process under the second prong of the Roth test. 48
III.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SANDIN V. CONNER

A.

The Court's FormerMethodology Was in Need of Revision
The Court in Sandin had ample justification for changing its former
prison due process analysis. First, although combing prison regulations for mandatory language and substantive predicates was a fairly
objective judicial undertaking, this approach often produced widely
different results to similar problems.
For example, suppose a
prison finds inmates A and B guilty of reasonably similar violations but
punishes A by revoking a mandatory, statutorily-created interest and
punishes B by imposing a discretionary change in confinement."'
Under the Court's former scheme, A would have been able to challenge the prison's failure to provide due process in federal court but
not B, even if B's punishment was more severe than A's.' 5' An
unequally unsatisfactory outcome would have occurred if A and B
were inmates in different states and both received solitary confinement for the same infraction, but the prison code of A's state
contained the words "shall be confined" and the prison code of B's

144. See id. at 2310 (Breyer,J., dissenting) (noting importance of relevant factual dispute to
requirement of additional procedures).
145. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that just as courts do not hold hearings
without material issues of fact in dispute, so Due Process Clause does not allow inmates further
hearing procedures without a factual issue).
146. See id. (BreyerJ., dissenting) (asserting that finding that Conner was not deprived liberty
within meaning of Due Process Clause likely will result in defense moving for summaryjudgment
on remand, to which Conner would have to respond with specific factual showings to avoid
adverse judgment).
147. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that adjustment committee based findings
on Conner's admission of failure to comply with rectal examination).
148. See id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
149.

See 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 2, at 434 (explaining that prison authorities were able to

insulate actions from judicial review by assigning sanctions that did not involve liberty interests).
150. See id. (providing hypothetical for purpose of explaining contradictory aspects of Court's
approach).
151. See id (describing "patently absurd result" occurring even if one set of sanctions were
harsher than other).

1997]

SANDIN V. CONNER

state did not.'52 In essence, the Court's former standard rendered
an inmate's right to procedural due process dependent on the
fortuitous (or, if a state diligently avoided using mandatory language,
not so fortuitous) phrasing of prison regulations.'5 3
A second problem with the Court's pre-Sandin approach was its
emphasis of form over substance. Fixating on words alone, the Court
often failed to analyze whether prison authorities truly had the
discretion to alter the conditions of an inmate's confinement.5 4 In
Board of Pardons v. Allen, "'5 for example, the pertinent statute
instructed the Board of Pardons to grant parole only if it found the
prisoner was "able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding
citizen" and could be set free "without detriment... to the community."' 56 The Court treated the phrase "shall grant parole" as indicative of the state legislature's intent to curtail the Board's discretion
when making parole decisions. 57 Yet, as noted by Justice O'Connor
in dissent, the Court in Allen "utterly fail [ed] to consider whether the
purported 'standards' meaningfully constrain[ed] the discretion of
state officials [because e]ven a cursory examination of the Montana
statute reveal[ed] that the Board of Pardons [wa]s subject to no real
restraint."'
Moreover, an appellate court could not possibly have
reviewed the Board's parole decisions without substituting its own
subjective view of the inmate's fitness in place of the Board's equally59
subjective, discretionary findings.
The third and most damaging consequence of the Court's former
due process analysis was its theoretical inconsistency. States that made

152. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (indicating that, where liberty
interests derive from mandatory language of prison codes, fundamental right to liberty would
differ from state to state).
153. See id (GinsburgJ., dissenting) ("Liberty that may vary from Ossining, NewYork, to San
Quentin, California, does not resemble the 'Liberty' enshrined among 'unalienable Rights' with
which all persons are 'endowed by their Creator.'"(quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para.2 (U.S. 1776))).
154. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 381 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that majority in Allen relied on semantics over true substance of parole statute); Brief
Amicus Curiae of the CriminalJustice Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 13, Sandin
v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
155. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
156. Allen, 482 U.S. at 376-77.
157. See id. at 377-78 (explaining that language itself created presumption that parole release
would be granted).
158. I. at 384 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
159. See id. at 384-85 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated:
A parole statute providing that parole shall be granted unless the prospective parolee
'poses a danger to society' is not significantly different from one under which the
parole board's decisions are nonreviewable, since a court would be unlikely to reverse
a parole board decision made under such a discretionary standard.
Id. (quoting Herman, supranote 1, at 550).
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legitimate efforts to curtail arbitrary prison discipline on their own
faced constitutional scrutiny, but those states with the fewest proceNever was this
dural guidelines were not held accountable."6
of Correctionsv.
Department
disincentive more obvious than in Kentucky
Thompson," when the Court declined to find a liberty interest
because Kentucky's regulation was not "worded in such a way that an
inmate could reasonably expect to enforce [it] against the prison officials."162 The message from Thompson and other pre-Sandin cases to
the states was not subtle: take commendable steps to control the
discretion of prison officials or reduce arbitrary discipline, and you
will subject yourself to procedural due process claims in federal
court. 63 Lower courts thus imposed procedural due process when
it was least necessary, but denied the same when states refused to
police themselves."M For this reason alone, the Court's decision to
revise its standard was appropriate."
B.

"An Atypical and Significant Hardship"

In Sandin, the Court's new standard recognized state-created liberty
interests only for prison actions imposing an "atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.""6 As the following discussion explains, the Court failed to
provide useful instruction for lower courts attempting to apply this
standard to even remotely different factual scenarios. Moreover, the
Court's new approach may have the practical effect of eliminating

160. See Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2295, 2299 (1995) ("States may avoid creation of
'liberty' interests by having scarcely any regulations, or by conferring standardless discretion on
correctional personnel."); id. at 2303 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) ("[A] State that scarcely attempts
to control the behavior of its prison guards may, for that very laxity, escape constitutional
accountability; a State that tightly cabins the discretion of its prison workers may, for that
attentiveness, become vulnerable to constitutional claims.").
161. 490 U.S. 455 (1989).
162. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989). The Court
determined that the statute itself, which read "'visitor[s] may be denied a visit'" if they fall into
one of the described categories, does not create an objective expectation on behalf of prisoner
that visit necessarily would be allowed absent occurrence of one of listed conditions. Id. at 46465 (quoting Kentucky State Reformatory Procedures Memorandum, No. KSR 16-00-01 (issued
and effective Sept. 30, 1995)) (emphasis added).
163. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of
Petitioner at 12, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911) (describing
.paradoxical" message Court's cases sent to states). The Supreme Court itself characterized this
effect as "ironic." See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983) (noting built-in disincentive of
pre-Sandin analysis).
164. See 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 2, at 433 (explaining ironic result of Court's due process
methodology).
165. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) ("An incentive for ruleless prison
management disserves [a] State's penological goals and jeopardizes the welfare of prisoners.").
166. Id.

1997]

SANDIN V. CoNNER99

919

state-created liberty interests entirely as a significant source of due
process protection.
1.

Inadequateguidancefor lower courts
Beyond stating that Conner's disciplinary confinement was an
insignificant departure from the normal conditions of Conner's
confinement, 67 the Court did not elaborate on its "atypical and
significant hardship" language. For this reason, and because the
Court based its holding on three very case-specific factual considerations,"6 lower courts will likely be at a loss when applying the
Court's new test.' 69
First, in noting that disciplinary confinement involved the same
physical conditions as administrative confinement, which the prison
had broad discretion to impose, the Court found that the former was
not an "atypical and significant hardship." 7 ' According to the
Court, the state's expungement of the incident from Conner's record
negated the punitive aspects of his confinement, thereby reducing his
segregation to the administrative variety.'
The relevance of the
after-the-fact expungement, however, is dubious at best. Regardless
of whether his record ultimately reflected the incident, any procedural violation or stigma associated with disciplinary confinement
procedural violations already had occurred by that time. 17
In
assessing potential due process violations, reviewing courts must look
to the point at which due process logically attaches: before the
punishment is imposed. 7 Analyzing these situations in hindsight,
as the Court's treatment of the expungement suggested, renders due

167.

See id at 2301 (noting that Conner's punishment largely mirrored those conditions

imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody).
168. See iU at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing "special features" on which Court's
holding relied, including expungement of"high misconduct" incident from Conner's record by
deputy administrator).
169. Seeid.at 2306 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (foreseeing thatvagueness of Court's newstandard

"threatens the law with uncertainty"). According to justice Breyer, "some lower courts may read
the majority opinion as offering significantly less protection against deprivation of liberty, while
others may find in it an extension of protection to certain 'atypical' hardships that preexisting
law would not have covered." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 2301.
171. See id. (noting that expungement of"high misconduct" charge from Conner's record
nine months after he served time in segregation resulted in confinement not exceeding similar,
though totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of restriction).
172. See id. at 2309 (Breyerj., dissenting) (questioning how "a later expungement [could]

restore to Conner the liberty that, in fact, he had already lost").
173. See iU. at 2303 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("One must, of course, know at the start
the character of the interest at stake in order to determine then what process, if any, is
constitutionally due."); see also idUat 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Because Conner was found
guilty under prison disciplinary rules, and was sentenced to solitary confinement under those
rules, the Court should look to those rules.").
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process useless in preventing, as opposed to merely redressing,
1 74
arbitrary state action.
Second, regardless of the expungement, the Court also found that
"based on a comparison between inmates inside and outside
disciplinary segregation, the State's actions in placing [Conner] there
175
for 30 days did not work a major disruption in his environment."
AsJustice Breyer pointed out in dissent, however, the Court overstated
the similarities between inmates in the general population and those
in solitary confinement.176 Every day,. inmates in the general
population had approximately eight to twelve hours in which to leave
their cells, attend classes, work, and associate with one another. 77
In contrast, Conner's disciplinary segregation involved spending each
day alone in a cell, except for approximately fifty minutes in which to
shower and exercise while constrained by leg irons and waist
chains. 7 If, from the prison's perspective, disciplinary confinement
was supposed to deter inmate misconduct, 79 then thirty days of
such a punishment logically should have presented a fairly substantial
change in the inmate's environment.
As a third consideration, the Court explained that Conner's
confinement was "to be normally expected for one serving an
indeterminate term of 30 years to life.""8 Like the expungement
of Conner's record, however, the length and "indeterminate" quality
of his prison sentence should not have been relevant to the Court's
rationale.' 81 The Court prefaced its holding by stating that it was
returning to the principles it had applied correctly in Wolff and
Meachum, both of which examined the "nature" of the proposed
change in confinement rather than the language of prison regula-

174. See id. at 2303 n.1 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (recognizing that "hindsight cannot tell us
whether a liberty interest existed at the outset"); see also id. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(wondering how "a later decision of prison authorities [could] transform Conner's segregation
for a violation of a specific disciplinary rule into a term of segregation under the administrative
rules").
175. Id. at 2301. The Court noted that conditions at the prison actually involved significant
amounts of "lockdown time," even for inmates in the general population. See id.
176. See id. at 2305 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
177. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. See 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 2, at 422 (observing that, for prison rules to be effective,
sanctions are necessary). Deterrence in the prison environment is arguably more important
than in civilian society because the ordinary deterrent effect of the criminal system has not been
effective for convicted persons. See id. at 432 (noting that task of establishing prison rules must
account for unsuccessful deterrent force of criminal law).
180. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302.
181. SeeJohn Boston, Highlights of Most Important Cases, NAT'L PalS. PROJ. J., Summer 1995,
at 6 (doubting significance of Court's reference to length of Conner's prison sentence).
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tions. 82 Applying this rationale, however, one would expect the
"nature" of disciplinary confinement to be equally severe for all
183
inmates regardless of the length of their individual prison terms.

One commentator has suggested that the Court's reliance on the
foregoing considerations was necessary to preserve a majority of
Justices who, although refusing to remove procedural protection from
disciplinary confinement completely, nonetheless would support a
narrow holding that left ample opportunity to distinguish future
cases. 84 Whatever its motivation, the Court's meager application of
its new standard to the facts of Sandin has left numerous questions
open for interpretation.1 "a Most notable among these questions is
whether disciplinary confinement would be an "atypical and significant hardship" if the punitive action remained on an inmate's record
and clearly affected that inmate's parole prospects.18 6 Furthermore,
if an inmate's prison sentence were relatively short, would thirty days
of solitary confinement, even for administrative reasons, fall "within
the range of confinement normally expected"?8 7 Finally, would
solitary confinement for periods of sixty days or longer qualify as
"atypical and significant" relative to ordinary prison life?"ta Ironically, in answering these questions, lower courts may continue to resort
182. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300; i&. at 2298 (explaining that Court mistakenly had ceased
to focus on "nature" of deprivations). The Court's recollection of what it had done "correctly"
in Wolffand Meachum was somewhat inaccurate. In Wolffand Meachum, the Court also looked
to the mandatory language of prison regulations in drawing conclusions regarding the existence
of liberty interests. SeeMeachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 216,226-27 (1976) ("Here, Massachusetts law
conferred no right on the prisoner to remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned,
defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of misconduct."); Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
557 (1974) ("[H] ere the State itself has not only provided a statutory right to goodtime but also
specifies that it is to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior."). The only discernible difference
between the Court's treatment of Meachum and WofTon the one hand, and its treatment of
Greenholtz and its progeny on the other hand, is that in the latter cases the Court actually said
it was relying on the "unique structure and language" of the statute at issue. See Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). For this reason, the
Court's declaration that it was returning to the principles of Meachum and Wolff is not necessarily
a meaningful step toward adopting a more coherent basis for examining due process questions.
See Boston, supranote 181, at 6 (stating that Woo'contained substance, if not exact terminology,
of liberty interest analyses adopted later); see also discussion infra Part V.B (recommending
elimination of first prong of Roth test in lieu of mere reshaping of first prong requirement).
183. See Boston, supra note 181, at 6 (observing that length of inmate's sentence has no real
connection to case).
184. See id. (noting that presence of those factors suggested need to hold narrow majority
of Justices, because five probably would not have voted for broad ruling on disciplinary
segregation).
185. See id. at 5.
186. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (explaining majority's treatment of
expungement issue).
187. See supranote 129 and accompanying text (relating majority's emphasis on length of
Conner's sentence).
188. See Boston, supra note 181, at 8 (arguing that, after Sandin, duration of solitary
confinement may have no effect on whether deprivation is "atypical and significant").
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to state prison regulations for a more objective basis for distinguishing
varying degrees and durations of confinement.1 8 9
2.

The demise of state-created liberty interests?

9 the Court
In Vitek v. Jones" and Washington v. Harper,'
found
that the transfer of an inmate to a mental institution1 92 and the
administration of antipsychotic drugs without consent, 9 ' respectively, were severe enough to exceed the constitutionally permissible
scope of the inmates' criminal convictions.194 As a result, the Due
Process Clause, independent of any state prison regulations, granted
a liberty interest requiring procedural safeguards to accompany those
state actions. 95 In addition to Vitek and Washington, the Court has
recognized a class of punishments not severe enough to earn
independent Due Process Clause protection but still deserving of
some procedural protection.'9 6 The Court in Sandin openly rejected
the parsing of prison code language as a means for analyzing this
"broad middle category" of restraints. 197 A plain reading of Sandin,
however, suggests that the Court's new "atypical and significant
hardship" approach may not absorb this intermediate category. The
practical effect of this approach may be the end of state-created
liberty interests as sources of due process protection.
In finding a liberty interest originating from the Due Process Clause
itself, the Court in Vitek explained that the prisoner's transfer to a
mental hospital was not "within the range of confinementjustified by

189. See id.
(stating that lower courts may look to how states arrange disciplinary system into
hierarchy of punishments). Boston suggests that examining how states divide infractions and
sanctions may provide the "bright line" that lower courts will seek in applying the Supreme
Court's new standard. See i&L; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974)
(recognizing that, because state reserved deprivation of good-time credits as sanction for serious
misconduct, Court should not "discount its significance" as type of punishment).
190. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
191. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
192. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (concluding that felon is entitled to
procedural safeguards before being transferred to mental institution).
193. SeeWashington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (recognizing that nonconsensual
administration of antipsychotic drugs to inmate violated inmate's liberty interests that are
protected by Due Process Clause).
194. See Washington, 494 U.S. at 221 (finding that state practice infringed inmate's liberty
interest); Wtek, 445 U.S. at 493-94 (indicating that transfer of felon to mental institution without

any procedural safeguards was beyond scope of state's power).
195. See Washington, 494 U.S. at 221 (citing Due Process Clause as authority, independent of
any policy reason, for holding); VRek, 445 U.S. at 493-94 (recognizing that Due Process
protections apply to inmates being transferred to mental institution).
196. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2306-07 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging "middle category" of punishments that traditionally have not received
independent Due Process Clause protection but that nevertheless deserve some procedural
protection).
197. See id.at 2299-2300.
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the imposition of a prison sentence" because the consequences for
the prisoner were "qualitatively different" from ordinary confinement.198 In Sandin, the Court found that Conner's disciplinary
confinement was not a "dramatic departure" from normal prison
conditions because it fell "within the expected parameters of the
sentence imposed by a court of law."1" Based on this comparison,
it is difficult to conceive of punishments that would constitute
"atypical and significant hardships" without also qualifying for
constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause itself.2°°
Justice Kennedy, a member of the Sandin majority,0 1 previously
expressed his belief that a permanent ban on prison visitation
privileges would implicate the Due Process Clause directly.0 2 As for
parole release, it is unlikely that the Court would find denial of parole
an atypical, dramatic departure implicating due process.0" Therefore, unless the Court distinguishes future cases involving disciplinary
confinement, 2°4 then the transfer of an inmate to a mental hospital, 205 the administration of medication without consent,2 6 and
possibly a general ban on visitation 7 may be the only punishments
imposing "atypical and significant hardships" relative to ordinary
prison life. Because, however, each of these severe deprivations would
give rise to liberty interests under the Due Process Clause directly and
irrespective of state law, a court would have no reason to employ the
"atypical and significant hardship" analysis. 0 8 As a result of this
overlap, the concept of state-created liberty interests (which previously
had triggered procedural protection for restraints and deprivations
not qualifying for independent Due Process Clause protection) may

198. See Viek, 445 U.S. at 493-94.
199. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301.
200. See id.at 2303 n.2 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (recognizing that Court's new standard does
not clarify what deprivations would be "atypical and significant" without triggering direct Due
Process Clause protection).
201. See id. at 2295.
202. SeeBoston, supranote 181, at 6 (stating that "prison regulation permanently forbidding
all visits to some or all prisoners" would implicate Due Process Clause independently (citing
Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989))).
203. See id. (observing that denial of parole, although "significant," is not "atypical").
204. See id. (stating that Court's narrow holding in Sandin left room to distinguish future
disciplinary segregation cases).
205. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (finding liberty interest in avoiding
involuntary commitment to mental hospital arose under Due Process Clause directly).
206. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (holding that inmate possessed
liberty interest, under Due Process Clause, in avoiding involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs).
207. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (expressing view that prison regulation permanently forbidding visits would
implicate Due Process Clause independently).
208. See supranotes 205-07.
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cease to exist after Sandin.2 9 The Court in Sandin sought to
"reexamine the circumstances under which state prison regulations
afford inmates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause." 210 Unfortunately, its new standard may well result in the
elimination of state-created interests altogether. If so, then only the
most serious forms of discipline will entitle prison inmates to the bare
minimum procedural protection against arbitrary or erroneous
decisions.
C. Additional Considerations
The Supreme Court in Sandin stated that its former standard "led
to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of
prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting
benefit to anyone."211 For the Court, this situation did not comport
with its long-held view that federal courts should give "appropriate
deference and flexibility" to states in routine prison matters. 12 In
Sandin, the Court appeared to narrow substantially the kinds of due
process claims an inmate may bring in federal court.2" Nevertheless, although the Court's former standard needed revision fdr other
reasons, 21 4 Sandin was not necessarily a sound case in which to
address these policy concerns.
As the dissenting Justices recognized, even if the Court had
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's opinion, two important factors hinted
that Conner's case probably would have failed on remand to the
District Court. 215
First, according to the prison adjustment
committee's report, Conner was found guilty of misconduct based on
his own admissions of initially failing to comply with the strip
search.1 6 Second, there was no indication in Conner's affidavits or
otherwise that the witnesses he wished to call would have contributed
209. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2306 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (opining that rationale adopted by
majority potentially riddles existing law with uncertainty regarding reach of protected liberty
interests).
210. Id. at 2295.
211. Id. at 2299.
212. See id. (indicating that oversight by states as opposed to federal judicial oversight is
necessary to address complexities associated with running daily prison operations).
213. See supranotes 197-210 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
215. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing that, as presented,
record did not show that Conner was denied due process); id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting improbability of Conner withstanding petitioner's renewed motion for summary
judgement under second prong).
216. See id. at 2310 (BreyerJ., dissenting). According to the adjustment committee's report,
its finding of guilt was based on Conner's own statements that he was hesitant to comply while
he was strip-searched, that he turned around, "eyed-up" the guard whom he disliked, and that
he used profanity. See i. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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Thus, under the second prong
evidence relevant to his claim.1
inquiry regarding whether Conner had in fact received adequate
procedures, the prison would have prevailed on a renewed motion for
that his
summary judgment, unless Conner somehow had shown
218
witnesses would have presented a material disputed fact.

Despite these considerations, the Court used Sandin to create a
potentially sweeping standard rather than wait for a case with better
facts. By leaving fewer questions open, a different case would have
provided far more instruction to lower courts left with the task of
applying the "atypical and significant hardship" approach.
IV. RECOMiENDATIONS

Two policy considerations factored heavily in the Supreme Court's
decision to modify its prison due process doctrine in Sandin v. Conner
First, the standard for reviewing inmate claims should not discourage
states from drafting regulations that curtail the discretion of prison
officials to impose arbitrary discipline;2 9 and second, comparatively
insignificant prison matters should not be subject to due process
scrutiny in federal courts.22 ° In Sandin, the Justices unanimously
agreed to both propositions22 ' but disagreed substantially about
whether solitary confinement was a "comparatively insignificant"
prison matter.2 22 Without engaging in subjective line-drawing, there
is no perfect method for distinguishing minor punishments from

at 2303-04 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) ("[A] call
217. See id. (BreyerJ., dissenting); see also id&
for witnesses is properly refused when the projected testimony is not relevant to the matter in
controversy." (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974))).
218. See id. at 2304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
219. See idat 2299 (recognizing that alternative standard may interfere with state's attempts
to codify prison regulations).
220. See id. at 2299-2300 (indicating that issues surrounding daily operations ofprisons would
be handled best by states).
221. The majority opinion andJustice Breyer's dissenting opinion explicitly supported both
Scalia, J., Kennedy, J.,
and Thomas, J.); id.
policy goals. See id, (Rehnquist, CJ., O'Connor, J.,
at 2306 (BreyerJ., and SouterJ., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's dissent argued strongly against
the Court's former approach for its flawed incentives to states. See id. at 2303 (GinsburgJ., with
Stevens,J., dissenting). By maintaining that liberty interests derive directly from the Due Process
Clause and by placing disciplinary segregation in that protected category, it is unlikely that
Justice Ginsburg would have found an inmate to possess a liberty interest in avoiding the
deprivation of a tray lunch as opposed to a sack lunch. See id. at 2302-04 (Ginsburg, J., and
Stevens,J., dissenting); id. at 2299-2300 (finding that trivial claims, including right to receive tray
lunches, have proliferated in federal courts (citing Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir.
1990))).
222. Compare id. at 2301-02 (finding that disciplinary segregation was not "atypical and
significant" relative to ordinary prison life), with il at 2302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(concludingthat Conner's disciplinary segregation "effected a severe alteration in the conditions
of his incarceration" (citing id.at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting)), and id. at 2305 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (maintaining that disciplinary segregation "worked a fairly major change in Conner's
conditions").
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major ones.2" Any workable approach to this problem must be
faithful to the underlying purpose of the Due Process Clause itself:
fairness.
A. A BalancingApproach
The fundamental difficulty with the Supreme Court's analysis of
prison due process questions extends far beyond Sandin's "atypical
and significant hardship" standard. Sandin is merely the Court's latest
attempt to recast the first prong of Roth and prevent most claims from
reaching the second prong's factual inquiry.224 The first prong,
however, is inherently problematic. By inquiring whether the
prisoner is entitled to any due process as a threshold matter, the first
prong forces courts to apply either due process in principle or no due
process at all. 2" This "all-or-nothing" approach fails to consider that
due process is a flexible concept that necessarily must account for the
relative importance of the interests involved.226 On the one hand,
criminal defendants are afforded a "full panoply" of procedures
because their interest in a fair outcome greatly outweighs the state's
interest in law and order.227 Prisons, on the other hand, reasonably
can justify not providing inmates with confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel rights in the interest of institutional safety and
order.22' Nevertheless, prisons realistically can and do achieve a
substantial degree of fairness in the presentation of facts by providing
minimal procedures like the right to call witnesses. 229 The second
prong of Roth, unlike the first-prong threshold, allows for this

223.

See Boston, supranote 181, at 8 (perceiving that subjective line-drawing, which Court's

"atypical and significant hardships" standard essentially encourages, is undesirable).

224. See supranotes 29-34 and accompanying text.
225. See supranotes 30-32 and accompanying text.
226. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2309 (BreyerJ., dissenting) ("'[D]ue process' itself is a flexible

concept, which, in the context of a prison, must take account of the legitimate needs of prison
administration when deciding what procedural elements basic considerations of fairness
require."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this
Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.").
227. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2309 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (explaining that amount of process
due in prison context "is not the full blown procedure accompanying criminal trials").
228. See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-70 (1974) (holding that right to confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel are not required in prison disciplinary context).

"If

confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against the inmate were to
be allowed... there would be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls." Id. at
567.
229. See id. at 567 ("Rules of procedure maybe shaped by consideration of the risks of error
and should also be shaped by the consequences which follow their adoption.") (citations
omitted). In most cases, a prison can achieve a somewhat balanced evaluation of the facts by
providing written notice, a statement of factual findings, and the rights to call witnesses and to
present documentary evidence. See id. at 563-66.
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possibility by balancing the exigencies of prison administration against
the inmate's interest in fair discipline.2" For this reason, the Court
should dispense with the first prong altogether, leaving the second
prong balancing test as the only due process inquiry."'
Applying Sandin, lower courts must ask whether a deprivation 23is2
"atypical and significant" enough to proceed to the second prong.
If courts instead simply weighed the competing interests to determine
whether due process applied under the circumstances, 211 the
Supreme Court's primary policy concerns234 still largely would be
served. The second prong has proven capable of preventing due
process from attaching to minor prison matters.235 In fact, an
examination of cases in which the state-created deprivation at issue
did reach the second prong reveals that the Court, since Wolff, always
has found the state's procedures adequate under the circumstances. 236 As for the cases the Court previously dispatched under the
first prong, they probably would not have differed in outcome had the
Court used only the second prong.
Moreover, although eliminating the first-prong threshold may
increase the number of prison due process claims brought in federal
court in the short-run, the long-term effects of a balancing approach
230. See Herman, supranote 1, at 570-74 (proposing abandonment of first-prong threshold
of Roth).
231. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
("(W]hat procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action.").
232. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (detailing approach to be taken by courts in deciding
whether inmate had been deprived of protected liberty interest).
233. See Herman, supra note 1, at 573 (discussing effect of eliminating first-prong inquiry).
234. See supranotes 219-20 and accompanying text.
235. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that second prong limits
federal court intervention in ordinary prison matters).
236. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 (1983) (holding that, despite liberty interest in
avoiding administrative segregation, inmate received process due under circumstances);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979) (finding
that, although parole statute created liberty interest, state's procedures comported with
requirements of due process). In Board of Pardonsv. Alen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987), although the
Court found that the inmate did have a liberty interest in avoiding parole denial, there was no
second prong issue raised concerning whether the process given was sufficient. See id. at 380.
The Court in Sandinnoted thatbecause Hewittand Greenholtzwere disposed under the second
prong, its decision did not "technically" require overruling any of its prior holdings. See Sandin,
115 S.Ct. at 2300 n.5. This is inaccurate, however, because Allen in fact was decided under the
first prong alone, never reaching the second prong. Thus, Allen stands out as the only case the
Court truly needed to overrule in remaining consistent, but did not. Mystifyingly, the Court in
Sandin cited to Allen in support of the proposition that "[s]
tates may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 2300. Yet
there was nothing unique about Allen to distinguish it from any of the Court's other prison due
process cases, raising the question of whether the Court's pre-Sandin approach still persists
"under certain circumstances." SeeBoston, supranote 181, at 7 (recognizing inconsistency raised
by Court's citation to Allen).
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eventually would offset that disadvantage. First, as is true under the
first prong, summary judgment would preclude trivial claims under
the second prong if a court were to determine that no genuine
factual dispute existed. 37 Second, a balancing approach might
encourage states to draft more progressive regulations limiting the
discretion of prison officials to punish inmates arbitrarily. By
providing their own safeguards against arbitrary prison discipline,
states generally would administer discipline more fairly and simultaneously would avoid the cost of defending inmate due process claims
in federal court.
Finally, because the second prong balances both the institutional
and individual interests at stake when assessing a particular deprivation, procedural rights surely would receive more honest consideration than the first prong presently allows. 21 Some have suggested
that the Burger-Rehnquist Courts, when applying the second prong,
generally have overvalued the prisons' financial and logistical
burdens 23 9 and have underestimated the importance of procedural

fairness to prisoners. 2' Assuming this is true, a balancing approach
at least would force lower courts to assess an individual's interests at
all, for these interests often receive no consideration under the
2 41
current two-prong test.

237. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to summary judgment
as important legal mechanism for keeping trivial prison claims out of federal courts). Summary
judgment requires a genuine issue of material fact between the parties. See FED. IL Civ. P. 56.
In the prison context, the Due Process Clause does not require procedures unless there is a
genuine factual dispute between the parties as to the inmate's guilt. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at
2310 (BreyerJ., dissenting). This, in turn, provides legal protection against the meritless prison
case, of which Conner's claim may be one. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Had the Supreme
Court found that due process applied and thus remanded Conner's case to the district court,
the adjustment committee probably would have motioned for summary judgment on a new
ground, namely the second prong. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). If Conner could not show
a genuine issue of material fact, that being how his witnesses would have raised doubt as to his
guilt, then his case would have been unsuccessful. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
nonmovant "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" (citing
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e))). Therefore, summaryjudgment applies to the second prong balancing
approach in the same way that it applies to the first prong. Moreover, it still would apply to
limit federal court prison claims if the first prong were abandoned.
238. See Herman, supra note 1, at 573-74 (recognizing that balancing test at least would
eliminate threshold requirement of first prong, which often prevents individual interests from
being considered at all). Professor Herman also noted that a balancing approach would permit
judges to use common sense in determining which deprivations deserve procedural protection,
see id. at 574, because, if the first prong were eliminated, the rigid application of a threshold test
no longer would constrain judges' ability to provide due process where it truly is necessary.
239. See id. at 573 (commenting that, in its second prong balancing approach, Burger Court
often overvalued states' financial concerns).
240. See id. at 574 (observing that procedural safeguards, even in prison context, are not
nearly as burdensome on states--"nor as futile"-as Supreme Court maintained).
241. See id. (noting that, under present first prong threshold test, procedural values and
individual interests receive little consideration).
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B. An Example: Solitary Confinement
Under a balancing test, the ultimate question would be whether an
individual reasonably expected to receive certain procedural safeguards under the circumstances.24 In the case of inmate violence,
for instance, a court probably would find that the state's interest in
achieving immediate calm and security greatly outweighs an inmate's
The exigencies of such
expectation of receiving a hearing.2"
situations require prisons to take swift and decisive action, whether
punitive or administrative in nature, rather than wait until a guilty
finding is properly established."' Most courts view arbitrary official
conduct, if undertaken in good faith, as incidental to effective prison
2
management. 4
The balance would begin to shift, however, when the inmate
remains segregated in solitary confinement after the urgency of the
incident dissipates. The inmate's interest in a fair assessment of the
facts grows over time, but the prison's interest in taking prompt
action without procedural burdens decreases.2 4 Indeed, at some
point, the prison shares the inmate's interest in an accurate result
because the state theoretically has no legitimate interest in punishing
innocent prisoners. 2 7 When it deems the inmate's interest sufficient, a court expects the prison to have provided some combination
of written notice of the charges brought, a hearing at which the
inmate is informed of the prison's evidence, and an opportunity for
the inmate to testify, present documentary evidence, and produce
witnesses. 2 ' The state would prevail if the procedures it actually

242. See id. (suggesting that balancing test could consist simply of asking whether individual
reasonably expects to receive specific procedural safeguards under the circumstances).
243. See United States ex reL Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 717 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding
that, in case of vicious attack by one inmate on another, state interest in prompt, decisive action
outweighed inmate interest in due process). Justice Stevens, then a judge on the Seventh
Circuit, authored the Twomey decision.
244. See id. (stating that state is not obligated to "pause and assess responsibility for the

dispute before taking action").
245. See id ("Some mistakes and some arbitrary [official] conduct are inevitable incidents
of effective management of large groups of confined human beings.").
246. See id. at 717-18 ("In cases involving major rule infractions for which the punishment
is severe, after the immediate crisis is past, the relative importance of the inmate's interest in
a fair evaluation of the facts increases and the state's interest in summary disposition lessens
247. See iUt at 718 (observing that, in the long run, state's interest in just and fair result is
same as inmate's because neither has valid interest in treating innocent inmate as guilty).
248. SeeWolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974) (describing procedures to which
inmate is entitled under Constitution).
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provided equals or exceeds those required under the circumstanc2 49
es.
Reducing the current two-prong approach to a single balancing test
probably would not change the outcome of most due process
cases," ° for even a "full panoply" of procedural protections would
not necessarily help an inmate prevail on the merits.2 51 In whatever
quantity, procedural safeguards merely increase the likelihood of an
accurate result.1 2 A balancing approach, when compared to the
"atypical and significant hardship" threshold required by Sandin,
would acknowledge more effectively the relative, non-absolute nature
of procedural due process.
CONCLUSION

In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court found that thirty days in
solitary confinement was not an "atypical and significant hardship"
relative to ordinary prison life. The Court's creation of a new
approach for analyzing prison administrative and disciplinary actions
is more important than its holding. Without additional criteria for
determining whether a particular deprivation meets the new first
prong threshold, lower courts and practitioners are left with a very
narrow example of how the Court intends its new standard to
function. At the same time, the Court's new approach may signal the
end of prison due process insofar as severe, but not the most extreme,
forms of punishment are concerned. Because due process is a matter
of degree and not absolutes, a balancing approach would strike a
more appropriate equilibrium between prisoners' rights and deference to state prison administrators.

249. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2303 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
that Conner's case would not have succeeded if procedures provided by state were adequate
under circumstances); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,477 (1983) (holding that inmate received
process due under circumstances); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979) (finding state provided sufficient procedures).
250. See 1 MUSHLIN, supranote 2, at 434 (stating that altering tests for analyzing due process
questions does not necessarily change result in any particular case).
251. See id. (explaining that guarantee of procedural safeguards is no guarantee of success
on merits of claim).
252. See id. (observing that procedural safeguards serve only to increase likelihood of
accurate result in given case).

